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The Taylor rule (1993) focuses only on two objectives: output and 
inflation. In practice, the central bank’s loss function (especially in developing 
countries) contains objectives other than these two, like the interest rate 
smoothing, exchange rate stabilisation, etc. In this study, the monetary policy 
reaction function has been estimated, including five objectives for monetary 
policy as well as controlling for the effect of three other factors. Whereas the 
results confirm the counter-cyclical response of monetary policy to the factors in 
the loss function, the response of interest rate to changes in the foreign exchange 
reserves and the government borrowing has been negative. Variance 
decomposition shows that most of the variation in the interest rate is explained 
by its own lagged values. Other variables, in explaining variation in the interest 
rate, can be ranked as inflation, government borrowing, exchange rate, output 
gap, trade deficit, and, finally, the foreign exchange reserves. 
 
JEL classification:  E52, E52, E58 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the seminal work by Taylor (1993) on using monetary policy rules 
in a practical way, researchers have been trying to explore the policy reaction 
function for different countries. One practical issue in the Taylor rule is the 
monetary policy objectives considered in the rule. According to this rule there 
are only two objectives of monetary policy: output and inflation.
1  In practice 
central banks have objectives other than these two like interest rate smoothing 
and exchange rate stabilisation. This issue becomes more important in 
developing countries where exchange rate is not flexible and governments 
depend heavily on seignorage revenues due to limited effort to generate 
revenues from other sources and heavy budget deficits. So if these countries use 
Taylor rule as practical guide for monetary policy then the rule would be 
incomplete in the sense that it does not address the issues faced by the monetary 
authorities. So the point here is that before suggesting any rule to a central bank, 
one should be very clear on monetary policy objectives in the country.  
In estimating monetary policy reaction function, researchers have 
included variables other than the output and inflation in their estimation 
procedure like the interest rate smoothing factor, exchange rate, stock prices, 
government debt, foreign interest rate and foreign exchange reserves.
2 Another 
point is worth discussing here. In estimating response of the central banks to 
different variables, researchers miss-specify the reaction function. The problem 
arises because of not including the variables in the reaction function that have 
important information about the variable used as monetary policy instrument. 
This issue is important if instrument (for which central banks set operational 
                                                 
Acknowledgements: The author acknowledges helpful comments by Dr Ather Maqsood 
Ahmed. Discussions with Muhammad Waheed, Mahmood Khalid, Tasneem Alam, Zahid Asghar, 
Muhammad Arshad, Saghir Pervaiz Ghauri, and Akhtar Hussain Shah were also useful in writing 
this paper. 
1One may think that these other variables/objectives are included in the Taylor rule by many 
researchers. Of course it is the case, but weights on these other variables have not been yet decided 
in the literature. So unless we are able to decide on these weights, Taylor rule can be used only in its 
original form. Also as stated earlier, the Taylor rule has only two objectives; so the equations 
specifying interest rate as a function of some other variables are reaction functions and not the 
Taylor rules.  
2See, for instance, Hsing and Lee (2004), Chang (2000), Bernanke and Gertler (1999), 
Rigobon and Sack (2003), Shortland and Stasavage (2004), and Sheehan (1985), among others, for 
including different variables in the reaction function.   2 
target) of monetary policy is determined in the market. Deviation of policy rate 
from the target is possible because of factors affecting the instrument but they 
are not the monetary policy objectives. For instance, foreign exchange reserves 
and the government borrowing from the central bank explain the behaviour of 
interest rate, though they are not the policy objectives
3. Hence the reaction 
function would be miss-specified if estimated without these variables. These 
other factors serve as control variables in estimating reaction function.  
The present study focuses on the estimation of monetary policy reaction 
function for Pakistan to find the monetary policy objectives. Another objective 
is to find variables, other than monetary policy objectives, that affect the 
behaviour of interest rate. These factors are indicators of control errors as they 
cause deviation of interest rate from the operational target. The motivation 
behind this study is estimation of the Taylor rule for Pakistan in Malik and 
Ahmed (2007). In that study, we have estimated the Taylor rule and found that 
SBP had not been following such a rule. There we have found very low values 
of R
2 and DW statistics: both show that there are missing variables in the 
equation. It means there are certain objectives of monetary policy, other than 
output and inflation that the SBP focuses on. So, present study deals with 
identifying these other objectives of monetary policy in Pakistan. 
We have estimated monetary policy reaction function including five 
objectives for monetary policy: output, inflation and exchange rate stabilisation, 
interest rate smoothing, and reducing the trade deficit. As for as the variables 
other than policy objectives are concerned, we have included two variables in 
the reaction function: foreign exchange reserves and government borrowing 
from the central bank. Regarding the policy variable, we have used the short 
term interest rate (inter bank offered rate) as the monetary policy instrument.
4 
This is consistent with most of the empirical literature on the issue at hand 
including Taylor (1993).
5  In estimation, foreign interest rate has been used as 
exogenous factor. 
We have estimated the impulse response functions and variance 
decomposition by estimating VAR. Estimated impulse response functions show 
that if there is a positive shock in the interest rate, output, inflation, exchange 
rate and/or in trade deficit, interest rate would respond positively but the 
direction of change in interest rate is reversed when shock occurs in foreign 
exchange reserves or government borrowing. Variance decomposition shows 
                                                 
3It should be noted here that these two variables could be included in monetary policy 
objective function. But normally it is not the case because the objective of foreign exchange reserves 
is indirectly captured by exchange rate and inclusion of the second variable is mismatched with the 
central bank independence.  
4Inter bank offered rate, also known as the call money rate is equivalent to federal funds rate 
in U.S. 
5There is evidence in Agha, et al. (2005) that interest rate channel works in monetary policy 
transmission mechanism in Pakistan.   3 
that most of the variation in interest rate is explained by its own lagged values. 
Other variables, in explaining variation in interest rate, can be ranked as 
inflation, government borrowing, exchange rate, output gap, trade deficit and 
finally the foreign exchange reserves. 
Remaining portion of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 deals 
with the choice of variables and theoretical framework. In Section 3 some 
preliminary statistics and historical facts regarding monetary policy instrument 
and objectives and other variables included in the model are presented. Data 
issues and methodology have been discussed in Section 4. Section 5 includes 
results and finally Section 6 concludes the study.  
 
2. THE CHOICE OF VARIABLES AND THE  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In estimating monetary policy reaction function researchers included 
variables other than output and inflation in their estimation procedure. Two 
of them, exchange rate and interest rate smoothing variable-lagged interest 
rate are more widely used [see for instance, Hsing and Lee (2004); Chang 
(2000) for both and Assane and Malamud (2002); Gerlach and Smets (2000); 
Amonde (2006); Setlhare (2004) for exchange rate, among others for recent 
review].
6 Another potential variable that is included in the monetary policy 
reaction function is asset prices. Central banks respond to stock market 
indicators by including deviation of asset prices from the normal trend in 
their policy reaction function [see for example Bernanke and Gertler (1999); 
Rigobon and Sack (2003) among others for including stock prices in the 
reaction function]. Debt accumulated by the government and government 
borrowing from the central bank are also included in the response function 
of central bank. We have found single study for each, Sheehan (1985) for 
debt and Shortland and Stasavage (2004) for government borrowing. The 
latter study also includes foreign reserves in the response function of central 
bank. If capital mobility is important for an economy then monetary policy, 
while setting interest rate, focuses on foreign interest rate as well [for 
example Shortland and Stasavage (2004)]. 
We have used the short interest rate (inter bank offered rate or call money 
rate, CMR) as monetary policy instrument.
7  The main reason for using this 
variable instead of using the discount rate is the fact that discount rate is only a 
policy tool to achieve operational target for the instrument that can also be 
achieved by other policy tools like open market operations and changes in the 
required reserve ratio. This is consistent with most of the empirical literature on 
                                                 
6Romer (2001), while discussing possible changes in Taylor rule, suggests inclusion of 
exchange rate and lagged interest rate in the rule. 
7Inter bank offered rate also known as call money rate is equivalent to federal funds rate in 
U.S.   4 
the issue at hand including Taylor (1993); Goodfriend (1993); Clarida, et al. 
(1998; 2000) among others.
8  
As for as the objectives of monetary policy are concerned, we have 
included in our estimation the inflation (Inf), output gap (Y-Gap), interest rate 
smoothing variable (lagged interest rate), exchange rate deviation from the trend 
(ERD) and trade deficit (TD). It is well established in the literature on monetary 
policy that price stability is the prime objective of any central bank. This has 
been taken as one of the objectives in the Taylor (1993) rule and all empirical 
studies on the estimation of monetary policy objective function. High and 
variable inflation creates uncertainty making it harder to interpret the message 
conveyed by the price changes. This uncertainty creates problem for consumers 
and investors in making optimal decisions. So price stability is the prime target 
of monetary policy in almost all of the countries. The second most important 
objective that enters the loss function of most of the central banks is the output 
stability around the potential or the normal level as the central banks are not, 
according to King (1997), ‘inflation nutters’. So, even the inflation targeting 
countries do care about output fluctuations in conducting monetary policy. 
Again this variable has been included in almost all of the empirical studies on 
the central bank’s reaction function. This objective is important to keep 
unemployment on the natural rate.  
Other than variables in the Taylor rule, interest rate smoothing has 
been widely accepted as monetary policy objective and is included in 
estimation of policy reaction function in a number of studies. Interest rate 
stability is important because it creates the stable demand for investment. 
Too high interest rate discourages investment resulting in higher 
unemployment. High interest rate also reduces public support for the central 
bank independence if people perceive high interest rate as a result of too 
tight monetary policy [Mishkin (2001), Chapter 14)].
9  In open economies, 
especially with the fixed or managed floating exchange rate regime, 
exchange rate stabilisation becomes important for both exports as well as for 
domestic monetary objectives like inflation. Low exchange rate makes 
domestic products less competitive in the world market.
10 This results in 
lesser exports demand and ultimately in the slow economic growth. On the 
other hand, high exchange rate makes terms of trade against the home 
country and increases inflation in the domestic economy.  
                                                 
8Shortland and Stasavage (2004) and Chang (2000) estimated response of discount rate to 
other variables. Some other studies included monetary aggregates as policy instrument in estimating 
the policy reaction function, [see for instance, Barro (1978); Mishkin (1981); Melvin (1983); 
Chochrane (1989); and more recently Fung (2000)]. 
9However high interest rate might be good if it results from higher demand for investment 
and not because of the tight monetary policy [Poole (1999)]. 
10This is true if we define exchange rate as the domestic currency price of the foreign 
currency.   5 
Continuous trade deficit can create problem, if the exchange rate is either 
fixed or managed floating, by depleting foreign exchange reserves, which 
creates problems both for currency valuation as well as for the imports. 
However, to our knowledge we are first time using this variable and we could 
not found this in the empirical studies on the present issue. Nevertheless, it is an 
important factor for monetary policy setting, especially for developing countries 
like Pakistan. Stock price stabilisation is important because it has the wealth 
effect that changes private consumption and investment [for instance, Mishkin 
(1995) and Bernanke and Gertler (1995)].
11  
As control variables, we have taken two variables, other than the policy 
objectives, that may affect interest rate in any period. These are government 
borrowing from the central bank (GB) and the foreign exchange reserves (FER). 
In developing countries, where governments have to spend on development 
projects with increasing fiscal deficit, seignorage is an important source of 
revenues and governments rely heavily on borrowing from the central banks.
12 
Similarly changes in foreign exchange reserves have important implications for 
developing countries. In fixed exchange regime any attempt by the central bank 
to stabilise exchange rate results in changing foreign exchange reserves that 
have important implication for domestic monetary policy. Finally, the foreign 
interest rate (FI) has been taken as an exogenous variable that has important 
implications for domestic policy setting.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
Monetary policy objectives are often summarised by a monetary 
authority’s loss function. Then depending on the monetary policy framework, 
policy instrument is characterised by either explicit reaction function like the 
Taylor type rule or by an implicit reaction function in inflation targeting rules.
13 
But whatever is the policy framework, the objective of the monetary policy 
remains to minimise the loss function defined over certain variables. In the 
literature, loss function is normally defined over two main objectives: inflation 
and output [e.g. Romer (2001)] as, 
*) , ( π − π = t t t y f L     … … … … …  (1)         
where yt is deviation of output from potential level and πt and π
* are current and 
target level of inflation, respectively. 
                                                 
11Initially we have included the stock price index in the estimation. But as its effect on the 
interest rate was negligible we have excluded it from the final estimation. Similarly we did not find 
indication of focus of monetary policy in Pakistan on the stock market performance in the reports 
and documents of State Bank of Pakistan. 
12This is also a result of partial autonomy of central banks in these countries. 
13See Taylor (1993) and Svensson (2003) for reference.   6 
However, in practice, central banks have more than two objectives. For 
instance, Mishkin (2001) states six objectives of monetary policy: employment, 
economic growth, price stability, interest rate stability, financial sector stability, 
and exchange rate stabilisation. So a number of researchers, when estimating the 
Taylor rule or monetary policy reaction function, have included different 
variables/targets in the reaction function. So if we take all of the objectives of 




t t t t t t t i i td er er i i y L L − − − π − π = − , , , , , ( 1
*  …  …  (2)    
Where it is policy instrument rate, er and er
t are exchange rate and trend value of 
exchange rate, td is trade deficit and i
f is the foreign interest rate. 




t t t t t t t i i td er er i i y i i − − − π − π = − , , , , , ( 1
*   …  …  …  (3)    
An important point is worth discussing here. Although this function 
explains how interest rate would change when any of the variables in the loss 
function changes, complete modelling of the short interest rate requires 
inclusion of other variables in the reaction function that significantly explain 
variation in the interest rate. This is important in estimation process as two 
variables might be correlated because of their joint correlation with a third 
variable that is missing. In this case, one may find significant impact of a 
variable because of another missing variable. So the effect of variables 
(monetary policy objectives) on interest rate makes sense only if we control for 
the effect of certain other variables. As discussed above, we have included two 
such variables in our estimation of determinants of the reaction function: 
government borrowing from the central bank and the foreign exchange reserves.  
In this case the reaction function becomes 






t t t t t t t fer gb i i td er er i i y i i − − − π − π = −   …  …  (4)    
Where gb is government borrowing from the central bank and fer is the foreign 
exchange reserves. 
Now we briefly explain the theory on how changes in the monetary 
policy instrument—the short interest rate affect the monetary policy objectives 
and how the other factors in the reaction function 4 affect the interest rate.  
Increase in the short interest rate induces bank lending rate to be high. 
Assuming that private investment is interest sensitive, there would be lesser 
investment demand inducing aggregate demand to be lower. Now if inflation 
depends on lagged output demand, this action lowers the inflation, though after 
some lag. This mechanism can be explained from the following equation. 
↓ ↓→ ↓→ ↑→ ↑→ Inf AD I i i L    7 
Lowering policy instrument rate makes commercial banks decrease the 
lending rate. This promotes investment and hence the aggregate demand. If the 
output is demand determined then output would increase by the loose monetary 
policy. 
↑ ↑→ ↑→ ↓→ ↓→ Inf AD I i i L  
Increase in the domestic interest rate attracts foreign investment, thereby 
increasing foreign exchange reserves. This capital inflow strengthens the 
domestic currency.  
↓ ↑→ ↑→ ↑→ ER FER low CapitalInf i  
By increasing short interest rate, central bank can increase bank lending 
rate. This would lower domestic demand for foreign goods thereby lowering the 
trade deficit. It also has an indirect effect by lowering inflation that makes 
domestic goods more competitive in the world market and hence increases 
exports. These two relations are explained by the following two equations. 
↓ ↓→ ↑→ ↑→ TD D i i f L  
↓ ↑→ ↓→ ↑→ ↑→ TD Ex Inf i i L  
Where Df is domestic demand for foreign goods. 
Monetary policy can affect stock prices in a number of ways. If stock prices 
are decreasing, central bank can lower interest rate to provide loans to the stock 
investors. Lower interest rate also has another effect: it discourages bank deposits 
and provides funds for alternative assets like the stocks. On the other hand if stock 
market is facing a bubble, central bank can tight monetary policy thereby increasing 
bank deposit rates. Following two equations explain these two effects. 
↑ ↑→ ↓→ ↓→ SP D i i S D  
↑ ↑→ ↓→ ↓→ SP D i i S L  
Where iD is the bank deposit rate and Ds is the demand for stocks. 
Changes in government borrowing from the central bank and foreign 
exchange reserves affect the monetary base and hence the interest rate.  
↓ ↑→ ↑→ i MB GB  
↓ ↑→ ↑→ i MB FER  
Increased interest rate in the domestic country attracts foreign exchange 
reserves, adding to the capital account of balance of payment, which has 
important implications for investment in the home country, for domestic   8 
currency valuation and for inflation.
14  It should be noted here that keeping the 
interest rate equal to foreign interest rate is not the objective of monetary policy. 
However it is targeted to achieve some other domestic objectives. 
 
3.  SOME BASIC STATISTICS 
In this section we briefly discuss some basic statistics (mean, measures of 
dispersion and correlation of short interest rate with one period lagged values of 
all other variables) over the period taken in the study. The results are 
summarised in Table 1 (and the actual behaviour of variables by simple plot is 
given in Appendix C). Regarding these statistics, there are some important 
points to be discussed here. In the period 1993–2005, output gap and exchange 
rate deviation from the trend remained zero, on average. This indicates that, on 
average, monetary policy remained successful in bridging the gap of output and 
exchange rate from their respective trends.  Inflation in this period was on 
average 7.5 percent, which is an indication of SBP’s long run inflation target as 
well as the optimal level of inflation. Another interesting point is that domestic 
average interest rate in this period was almost double than the foreign interest 
rate in the same period. Not only this, the volatility of domestic interest rate was 
also high than that in the foreign interest rate. The highest correlation of 
monetary policy instrument has been found with the foreign interest rate 
followed by that with the foreign exchange reserves. Interest rate smoothing 
seems another objective of monetary policy as the short interest rate is strongly 
correlated with its own lagged values.
15 Interestingly, short interest rate is highly 
correlated with inflation but not with the output gap, showing that monetary 
policy in Pakistan seems to have a focus on inflation but not on the output. 
Table 1 
Basic Statistics (1993–2005) 
 Average  Variance  St.  Dev  Maximum Minimum Correlation* 
CMR 8.34  13.06  3.61  15.42  1.05 0.72 
Y-Gap –0.32  6.37  2.52  8.54  –4.40  0.05 
Inf 7.51  12.64  3.56  13.14  2.65  0.68 
ERD –0.01  8.05  2.84 5.21 –5.69  0.21 
TD 14.25  115.69  10.76  51.35  –3.97  0.29 
GB 2.04  316.41  17.79  31.51  –42.05  0.37 
FER 3.88  14.41 3.80  11.40 0.21  –0.73 
FI 4.71  1.77  1.33  6.46  2.28  0.79 
* Correlation is calculated between short interest rate and lagged values of the other variable. 
                                                 
14But we need here the assumption of capital mobility, as interest rate is not the only factor 
affecting capital flight. Other factors like political stability, investment opportunities, risk etc. are 
important factors attracting capital in a country. 
15This has not remained the case however, when we controlled for other variables as shown 
in Section 5.   9 
3.1.  Shift in Mean Values 
If we see history of all the variables, the whole sample can easily be 
divided into two sub-samples; one with the mean of most of the variables above 
the long run average and the other with below it. So in terms of inflation and 
output, one period can be considered as boom and the other as recessionary 
phase of the economy. So we split the sample into two sub-samples, 1993–1997 
and 1998–2004 and mean values over these periods are given in Table 2. Last 
year is omitted as most of the variables have steep increasing trend in that year.  
 
Table 2 
Shift in Mean Values 
  Average Values 
   1993-1997 1998-2004  1993-2004* 
CMR  10.88 6.75 8.47 
Y-Gap  0.02 –1.40 –0.81 
Inf 11.29 4.60 7.39 
ERD  0.11 –0.08 –0.01 
TD  15.19 10.18 12.27 
GB 4.10  –2.01  0.53 
FER 1.56 4.64 3.36 
FI  5.47 4.27 4.77 
 
Wit respect to inflation and output gap, the period 1993-1997 can be 
termed as boom as both of these variables, on average, were above their long run 
average. However after reaching the peak in mid of this sub-sample, inflation, 
output gap and interest rate started declining. It can be seen from the Figure 2 in 
the appendix that output gap started declining before the inflation, which is 
according to Keynesian hypothesis that inflation is affected by the changes in 
aggregate demand, [for example Svensson (1997)].
16 Interestingly, monetary 
policy was tight (on average) in the same period as average short interest rate 
was 10.88 percent, higher than the long run average of 8.47 percent. This 
relation remained also stable in the next sub-sample where monetary policy was, 
on average, expansionary with the economy being in recessionary phase.  
Trade deficit has followed the same pattern in this period and its 
correlation with interest rate was also exactly the same as was of output gap. 
Exchange rate, on average, was negatively correlated with interest rate in that 
period as it was on average below the long run average. But this result might be 
                                                 
16In a Lucas type transmission mechanism, output is affected by unanticipated inflation, [see 
for instance, Cukierman (2001)].   10
misleading as most of the changes in exchange rate occurred in the period 
2000Q3-2002Q1 that have influenced long run average thereby making it biased 
upward. Similarly average value of government borrowing does not make sense 
here as most of the fluctuation in it came after the first period and in the second 
sub-sample there is no average trend. In the first period foreign exchange 
reserves were below the long run average so the relation between them and 
interest rate, on average, was according to the theory.  It is worth discussing here 
that interest rate started declining in the second period before the increase in 
foreign exchange reserves as the latter started increasing only after 2001Q2. So 
increasing foreign exchange reserves just added to interest rate decline and was 
not the only driving force behind interest rate change. Foreign interest rate 
movement was also correlated with the domestic interest rate and the timing of 
change was exactly the same as was with foreign exchange reserves.  
All that comes out of this discussion is that short interest rate responds 
counter cyclically to output and inflation in Pakistan if we take the average 
behaviour and not the period to period movements. So despite focusing on other 
objectives in the short run, SBP focuses on two primary objectives, inflation and 
output, in the long run. 
 
4.  DATA ISSUES AND ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
We have estimated monetary policy reaction function for Pakistan for the 
period 1993Q1-2005Q4. Data on all the variables except GDP are taken from 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) while that on GDP are taken from Kemal 
and Arby (2005).
17  The output gap has been constructed by fitting linear trend 
in seasonally adjusted real GDP and then calculating percentage deviation from 
this linear trend.
18  Inflation has been calculated as the percentage change in 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) over the last quarter and then taking four quarters 
moving average to get an annualised average inflation rate over the four quarters 
including the current one.  
Exchange rate deviation from the trend has been calculated by fitting the 
trend in the nominal exchange rate. However the trend in this variable is 
discontinuous; in the period 1993Q1-2001Q4 there is linear trend in exchange 
rate while after that period it fluctuated around a constant mean of 60. So we 
have used ‘Quadratic Spline’ to handle this issue. Data on trade deficit is taken 
from IFS in U.S. dollars, which has been converted into Pak rupees by 
multiplying with the nominal exchange rate. It has been adjusted for the 
seasonal pattern, divided by seasonally adjusted GDP and multiplied by 100 to 
                                                 
17As the data on GDP is available only for 1972-2003Q2, the last ten observations have been 
constructed by taking averages of quarters’ weights over the whole period and then multiplying these 
weights to annual real GDP of the last three years. 
18To have deviation from the long run trend we have taken data for the period 1987Q1-
2005Q4 for detrending.   11
have a measure of trade deficit as a percent of GDP.
19  Data on government 
borrowing have been taken as quarterly change in claims of central bank on the 
government. It is then made as a percentage of GDP and finally four quarters 
average is calculated to have average claims of central bank on government over 
the previous four quarters including the current one. Foreign exchange reserves 
have been taken in billion U.S. dollars. Finally the data on foreign interest rate 
have been taken as the average of U.S. 6-months Treasury bill rate and 6-months 
LIBOR. 
The reaction function in Equation 4 can be estimated by ordinary least 
square (OLS), two stage least square (TSLS), generalised method of moment 
(GMM), vector auto regression (VAR), vector error correction method 
(VECM), probit and logit models etc.
20  The most frequently used technique is 
the vector autoregression (VAR) approach, with which the analysis of 
monetary policy is done by estimating impulse response functions and 
variance decomposition of forecast error of policy instrument rate, [see for 
instance, Amonde (2006); Chang (2000); Hsing and Lee (2004) among others 
for recent studies]. Some studies estimated Taylor rule by simple OLS and 
recursive OLS techniques, [see for example Judd and Rudebusch (1998); 
Plantier and Scrimgeour (2002)]. Shen and Chen (1996) applied binary non-
linear models on time series data by making dependent variable binary by 
some categorisation. Following Shen and Chen (1996), Shortland and 
Stasavage (2004) estimated reaction function by multinomial logit. Following 
Romer and Romer (1989), Boschen and Mills (1995); Shen, Hakes and Brown 
(1999) estimated monetary policy reaction function by binary probit models, 
making narrative index for policy stance. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) 
used generalised method of moment (GMM) technique for estimating forward 
looking monetary policy reaction function for six countries. 
Although some studies have estimated Taylor rule by simple OLS, it is 
not the appropriate technique if contemporaneous values of variables on right 
hand side are taken. However there are estimation techniques that deal with 
endogeniety issues like two stage least squares (TSLS) or generalised method of 
moments (GMM). But finding instruments and classifying variables into 
endogenous and exogenous variables is not an easy job. So we have estimated 
monetary policy reaction function for Pakistan with the VAR model, which is 
more frequently used in estimation of the reaction function and takes care of 
endogeniety issue in the estimation.  
                                                 
19Trade deficit has been multiplied by minus one for direct interpretation and convenience 
as we used trade deficit instead of trade balance in estimation. 
20Different estimation techniques are based on different assumptions regarding the model 
and data. Probit and/or logit models can estimate the reaction function by making dependent variable 
comparable with these techniques. For example, we can classify interest rate change into two 
categories as: positive and negative change.     12










i t i D X C B BX ξ + + + = −
=
− = ∑ ∑
1
1 0    …  …  …  (5)   
Where Xt is a vector of endogenous variables given by, 
[] ′ π = t t t t t t t t fer gb td er y i X
* ,  
Where  
it is the short interest rate (call money rate taken as central bank’s 
operational target),  
  yt  is the real output gap,  
  πt  is four quarters average CPI inflation, 
  ert
* is deviation of exchange rate from the long run trend 
  gbt  is government borrowing from the central bank as a percent of GDP, 
  fert  is the log of foreign exchange reserves, 
  tdt  is trade deficit as a percent of real GDP. 
f
i t i −  is a scalar; the only variable that has been assumed to be exogenous 
in the system is the foreign interest rate.    
B  is a matrix of coefficients with one on the diagonal and capturing the 
contemporaneous effects of variables on each other. B0 is a vector of constant terms. 
C
i are the matrices of coefficients measuring the lagged effects of variables on each 
other.  ξt is a vector of error terms that contains zero mean, constant variance and 
serially as well as cross uncorrelated innovations, i.e. these elements represent pure 
structural shocks. System of Equations 5 can be converted into standard reduced 








i t e i D X A A X + + + = −
=
− = ∑ ∑
1
1 1 0    …  …  …  (6)     
Where,  0
1
0 B B A
− =   
i
i C B A
1 − =  
and  t t B e ξ =
−1  
Here et contains the elements that have zero mean, constant variance and are 
serially uncorrelated. However, these errors may be cross correlated, i.e. 
 
( ) 0 = jt e E , 
( )
2
j jt e Var σ = , 
( ) 0 , 1 = − jt jt e e Cov , 
but  ( ) kt jt e e Cov ,  may or may not be equal to zero.   13
Now the objective is to estimate the system 6 and then using these 
estimated parameters to identify the structural parameters and to recover 
structural shocks from the system 5 by imposing appropriate restrictions on the 
structural parameters. System of equations in 6 can be estimated by OLS 
because right hand side variables of all equations are same.  
Next we have identified the structural shocks to estimate the impulse 
response functions and variance decomposition of short interest rate to one standard 
deviation shock in all the endogenous variables. To identify the structural shocks, we 
have used Choleski decomposition with the assumption that monetary policy 
responds to endogenous variables with at least one lag. However the appropriate 








2 n n , where n is the 
number of variables in the VAR, [Enders (2004)]. Here the monetary policy shocks 
are estimated residuals from the first equation in system 5.  
  
5.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
As all of the variables in our analysis are stationary at level (integrated of 
order zero), we have estimated VAR in level. Also it has been estimated by OLS 
as it gives efficient parameter estimates as long as the right hand side variables 
are same in all equations [e.g. Enders (2004)]. We have selected one lag on the 
basis of Schwarz Criterion. This lag length is also appropriate practically, as we 
assume monetary policy responds to variables after one quarter and some of the 
variables are already previous four quarters averages. As we are primarily 
concerned with the estimation of monetary policy reaction function, here we 
present results of only the first equation in reduced form VAR – the estimated 
policy reaction function, (Detailed results from the VAR are given in Appendix 
B.   
*
111 1 1 1 1 2.28 0.17 0.33 0.18 0.24 0.03 0.44 0.07 1.47
f
tt t t t t t t t ii y e r g b f e r t d i π −−− − − − − =− + + + − − + +   
       (0.94)  (–1.26)    (1.93)        (1.67)         (2.18)       (–1.55)        (–2.83)            (1.66)        (2.90) 
 
Adjusted R
2:  0.78,        S.E:  1.69 
 
Here all parameters except for the intercept and lagged interest rate are 
significant, though the effect of output gap, inflation and exchange rate on 
interest rate is significant only at 10 percent level of significance. These results 
indicate that the State Bank of Pakistan target all of the variables in our model 
but does not smooth the interest rate. If output gap is positive, i.e. current output 
is above trend then SBP tights monetary policy by increasing the interest rate 
and vice versa. It should be noted however that the coefficient of output is not 
exactly the same as Taylor (1993) proposes but anyhow it is not significantly 
different from that, as shown by the Wald coefficient restriction test in Table 3.
21 
                                                 
21Taylor (1993) proposed coefficient of current output but we have estimated the reaction 
function using lagged values of all variables.   14
Table 3 
The Wald Test 
Hypothesis Chi-square  stats  P-value 
Coefficient of Output Gap = 0.5  0.96  0.33 
Coefficient of Inflation     = 1.5  142.51  0.00 
Coefficient of Inflation     = 1.0  54.81  0.00 
 
Inflation has statistically significant and positive effect on short interest 
rate but the magnitude of its coefficient is problematic. According to the Taylor 
principle this coefficient must be at least greater than one; otherwise the system 
would become unstable.
22  Coefficient of exchange rate shows that the SBP acts 
to tight monetary policy whenever the domestic currency depreciates. Trade 
deficit induces interest rate to be high to discourage the aggregate demand. This 
result is statistically significant but again like the government borrowing the 
magnitude of coefficient is quite small. Finally, monetary policy in Pakistan 
seems more dependent on exogenous (foreign) factors as our results show more 
than one for one movement of policy rate with the foreign interest rate.  
Coefficient of government borrowing is negative and statistically 
significant. It is also according to the theory as increased government borrowing 
from the central bank increases monetary base, which reduces interest rate. 
However the magnitude of coefficient is quite small. Same is the case with the 
variable of foreign exchange reserves; the effect of foreign exchange reserves on 
interest rate is negative and significant. We should keep in mind here that these 
two variables, government borrowing and foreign reserves are not in the 
monetary authority’s loss function so they explain variation in the interest rate 
that is not explained by the variables in the loss function.  
 
5.1.  Impulse Response Functions 
As stated in the introduction our primary focus in this study is to estimate 
the impulse response function of short interest rate due to changes in any of the 
endogenous variables we have taken. For this we have identified structural 
shocks by Choleski decomposition by imposing the restriction that monetary 
policy does not respond to any of the variables contemporaneously. With the 
help of these shocks, we have estimated response of interest rate to one standard 
deviation shock in each of the endogenous variables in the VAR. Results are 
give in Figure 1 below (detailed results are given in Table 5 in the Appendix). 
                                                 
22It is because the coefficient is less than one only if central bank procyclically responds to 
inflation deviation from the target.    15
Our results show that shock in the interest rate transmits into interest 
rate immediately and positively and this effect dies out to zero just after one 
quarter as only first quarter’s response is statistically significant. This 
behaviour confirms the result we have discussed above for monetary policy 
reaction function. If there is a shock in the output gap then monetary policy 
responds positively but after one quarter. Interestingly the effect starting in 
the second quarter reaches at the peak in the same quarter and dies out to 
zero in the third period. Monetary policy responds to inflation positively but 
only after two quarters. The effect starts in the third quarter and then 
gradually and slowly dies out to zero after two years. So inflation induces 
monetary authority to change stance of policy for longer time period. Shock 
in the exchange rate transmits into policy interest rate with a lag of one 
quarter and just like the case of output, the effect approaches to zero in the 
third quarter.
23 In case of trade deficit, a shock in this variable causes 
interest rate to increase—tight monetary policy. Like many other variables, 
this effect starts and reaches at peak in the second quarter and then dies out 
to zero in the third quarter.  
If there is a positive shock in foreign exchange reserves in the country 
then interest rate responds negatively to this shock after one quarter. The effect 
starts and then reaches at peak in the second quarter but approaches zero 
(statistically) in the fifth quarter. The effect of government borrowing from the 
central bank on interest rate is ambiguous. Interest rate responds negatively to 
government borrowing after one quarter. However this effect becomes positive 
in the first quarter of the second year and approaches zero in the second last 
quarter of the same year. This change in direction after some period might be 
due to inflation resulting from monetary policy accommodation of government 
borrowing. So we can say that the effect of government borrowing on interest 
rate is negative and direct in the short run but it is positive and indirect in the 
long run.  
In nutshell, we conclude here that monetary policy counter cyclically 
responds to output, inflation, exchange rate and trade deficit and the foreign 
exchange reserves and government borrowing from the central bank have also 
significant but negative impact on the short interest rate. All these results are in 
accordance with what the economic theory predicts. It should be noted however 
that the results in VAR somehow depend on the choice of lag length. But we 
have found that the direction of effect did not change even when we included 
two lags in the VAR. Nevertheless, the assumption of one lag is quite 
appropriate in the monetary policy analysis.  
 
                                                 
23Although the effect becomes negative after fourth quarter, it remains insignificant.   16
Fig. 1.  Impulse Response Functions (± 2 S.E.) 
 
5.2.  Variance Decomposition 
Finally we have decomposed the forecast error variance of interest rate to 
have an idea on the percentage explanation of interest rate by each of the 
endogenous variables. We have kept the same Choleski ordering as was in the 
case of impulse response functions. We have found that much of the variation in 
the interest rate is explained by its own lagged values, (about 73 percent in the 
first quarter). The second variable that explains much of the variation in the 
policy rate is the inflation rate. It explains about 18.57 percent of the variation in 
the interest rate. After this, three variables that explain more variation in the 
interest rate are respectively, the government borrowing from the central bank, 
exchange rate and the output gap. Their magnitudes are respectively, 15.69 
percent, 11.62 percent and 10.62 percent. Finally the trade deficit explains about 
4.71 percent of the variation in interest rate followed by the last variable, the 
foreign exchange reserves with a value of 2.74 percent. One important point to 
note is that as the time passed variation explained by interest rate itself is 
decreasing, while that by inflation and government borrowing is increasing. 
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Table 4 
Variance Decomposition of Interest Rate 
Quarters CMR  (–1)  Y-Gap  Inf  ERD  GB  FER  TD 
1  100.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2  73.59 8.90 0.02  11.38  0.32 2.01 3.78 
3  70.79 8.64 0.64  11.62  1.01 2.60 4.71 
4  68.35 8.36 1.95  11.30  2.62 2.74 4.67 
5  64.99 8.32 3.88  10.80  4.87 2.69 4.45 
6  60.98 8.51 6.13  10.44  7.23 2.53 4.19 
7  56.81 8.84 8.44  10.22  9.38 2.36 3.94 
8  52.82  9.23  10.71 10.10 11.21  2.21  3.72 
9  49.16  9.62  12.86 10.04 12.71  2.09  3.53 
10  45.87  9.98 14.88 9.98 13.92 2.01  3.36 
11  42.93 10.32  16.78 9.92 14.89 1.96  3.20 
12  40.29 10.62  18.57 9.85 15.69 1.93  3.06 
 
In summary, we have found the ordering of variables in explaining the 
highest variation in interest rate as: lagged interest rate, inflation, government 
borrowing, exchange rate, output gap, trade deficit and the foreign exchange 
reserves. The important result here is that inflation has more explanatory power 
for the interest rate than the output gap has. Similarly the government borrowing 
from the central bank and exchange rate can explain interest rate variation more 
than what the output gap can do.    
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
We have estimated monetary policy reaction function for Pakistan for the 
period 1993-2005 to identify the objectives of monetary policy in Pakistan. For 
this purpose we have included in our reaction function: the output gap, inflation, 
lagged interest rate, exchange rate and trade deficit as monetary policy 
objectives, while to overcome the issue of miss-specification, two more 
variables have been included in the reaction function that are not the policy 
objectives; foreign exchange reserves and government borrowing from the 
central bank. For the analysis we have used VAR to estimate impulse response 
functions and variance decomposition.  
Our results confirm that the State Bank of Pakistan does care about both 
inflation and output. However the policy has also been focused on other factors 
as all of the objectives we included in the estimation significantly affect the 
behaviour of monetary policy instrument. The important result is that the trade 
deficit that is not taken as monetary policy objective in the empirical literature 
has significant impact on the central bank (SBP)’s actions. Two variables that 
we have included other than objectives (government borrowing and foreign   18
exchange reserves) and the exogenous factor (foreign interest rate) also explain 
significantly the variation in interest rate.  
We suggest here that one should take into account these other objectives 
when modifying Taylor-type rule for a country like Pakistan. Simple Taylor rule 
that focuses on inflation and output may be incomplete for the developing 
countries. But including too many objectives into the rule looses the simplicity 
of these rules—an important characteristic of the instrument rules. Similarly 
there are not agreed upon parameter values for the variables, other than inflation 
and output that are more frequently included in modified Taylor rule. A 
potential area for research in this regard is that whether the inclusion of other 
variables in the reaction function would reduce the loss to the society or it is 





Response of Interest Rate to One Standard Deviation Shock in Each Variable* 













































































































































































Vector Autoregression Results 
 CMR  Y-Gap  Inf  ERD  GB  FER  TD 
–0.172438 –0.039928 0.003073  0.032469  0.075475 –0.025598  0.496732 
(0.13720) (0.12566) (0.04924) (0.17034) (0.69578)  (0.03737)  (0.52555)  CMR(–1) 
(–1.25683) (–0.31774) (0.06242)  (0.19062)  (0.10848) (–0.68490) (0.94518) 
0.332071 0.296446  –0.107986  –0.078352  –0.369580  0.026082  0.486715 
(0.17182) (0.15737) (0.06166) (0.21331) (0.87133)  (0.04680)  (0.65814)  Y-Gap(–1) 
(1.93269)  (1.88377) (–1.75124) (–0.36731) (–0.42416) (0.55726) (0.73953) 
0.183629 0.212984 1.078031 0.064288 0.245068  –0.050346  0.627770 
(0.11027) (0.10100) (0.03957) (0.13690) (0.55920)  (0.03004)  (0.42238)  Inf(–1) 
(1.66529) (2.10885) (27.2413) (0.46961) (0.43825)  (–1.67606) (1.48627) 
0.240692 –0.138124  –0.040542 0.413996 –0.750489  0.041016  0.372120 
(0.11032) (0.10104) (0.03959) (0.13696) (0.55946)  (0.03005)  (0.42258)  ERD(–1) 
(2.18176) (–1.36700)  (–1.02400) (3.02270) (–1.34146)  (1.36484)  (0.88060) 
–0.033811 0.004667 0.020956 –0.001215 0.834429  –0.015713  0.271041 
(0.02175) (0.01992) (0.00781) (0.02700) (0.11030)  (0.00592)  (0.08331)  GB(–1) 
(–1.55453) (0.23428) (2.68471) (–0.04501) (7.56516)  (–2.65203) (3.25330) 
–0.444884 0.162382 –0.003314  –0.534578 0.937174 0.859010  2.034125 
(0.15719) (0.14397) (0.05641) (0.19516) (0.79716)  (0.04282)  (0.60212)  FER(–1) 
(–2.83018) (1.12786) (–0.05874)  (–2.73925) (1.17564) (20.0606)  (3.37826) 
0.069862 0.078254 0.001791 0.103468 0.078602  0.016887  0.134374 
(0.04206) (0.03852) (0.01509) (0.05222) (0.21329)  (0.01146)  (0.16110)  TD(–1) 
(1.66106)  (2.03143)  (0.11867) (1.98155) (0.36853) (1.47390)  (0.83408) 
2.283534 –1.380956 1.841413  7.101295 –12.70220  2.415067  –9.925850 
(2.42945) (2.22514) (0.87189) (3.01617) (12.3203)  (0.66181)  (9.30594)  C 
(0.93994) (–0.62061) (2.11198) (2.35441) (–1.03100)  (3.64921)  (–1.06661) 
0.734554 –0.188908  –0.271052  –0.753003 0.632217  –0.136897  0.585514 
(0.25301) (0.23174) (0.09080) (0.31412) (1.28309)  (0.06892)  (0.96916)  FI 
(2.90322) (–0.81519)  (–2.98509)  (–2.39721) (0.49273)  (–1.98622) (0.60415) 
R-squared 0.816716  0.692645  0.976055  0.517614  0.812154  0.987726  0.706537 
Adj. R-squared  0.780953  0.632674  0.971383  0.423490  0.775501  0.985331  0.649276 
S.E. Equation  1.694681  1.552164  0.608192  2.103948  8.594104  0.461647  6.491428 
F-statistic 22.83702  11.54954  208.9064  5.499272  22.15799  412.4237  12.33887 
Akaike AIC  4.054415  3.878726  2.004897  4.487057  7.301579  1.453517  6.740391 
Schwarz SC  4.398579  4.222890  2.349061  4.831221  7.645743  1.797681  7.084555 
Determinant Residual Covariance  1090.979         
Akaike Information Criteria  29.37997         
Schwarz Criteria  31.78912         
* Standard errors and t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
APPENDIX C 
All of the series have been plotted with cubic trend to compare the 
average behaviour of a particular series with that of the short interest rate. It can 
easily be seen that interest rate, output gap, inflation and trade deficit follow 
almost the same trend. Trend in foreign interest rate is also same but the timing 
of curves is moderately different. Exchange rate, foreign reserves and 
government borrowing do not follow the same pattern as other series do. A 
simple result we can draw from here is that SBP focuses on output gap, inflation 
and trade deficit in the long run while other variables are correlated with interest 
rate only in the short run. Also, the monetary policy in Pakistan is much 
influenced by foreign interest rate.   20
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